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  Hon. Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge, United States District*
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 07-4754
            
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DERRICK KENRICK
a/k/a Charles Salter
Derrick Kenrick,
                            Appellant
            
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 04-cr-00291)
District Judge: Hon. Arthur J. Schwab
             
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 12, 2009
Before:  SLOVITER and BARRY, Circuit Judges, and
POLLAK , District  Judge*
(Filed: January 13, 2009)
             
OPINION
  This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 281
U.S.C. § 1291.
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
I.
Derrick Kenrick pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to traveling with an
intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) and was
sentenced to 46 months imprisonment, followed by a life term of supervised release.
Kenrick appeals the length of the term of supervised release authorized by the plea
agreement.1
II.
In May 2002, Kenrick began chatting with the victim, who was then 13 years old,
in an internet chat room.  Kenrick and the victim chatted on a frequent basis for
approximately two years, and in 2004, having proposed marriage, Kenrick traveled to
Pennsylvania to see her.  He soon began living in the victim’s home, giving her family
cash, furniture, and other valuable gifts.  During this time, he engaged in some sexual
contact with the victim, apparently short of sexual intercourse.  Kenrick was eventually
told by the victim’s parents to leave the victim alone, and he responded by threatening the
victim’s mother and falsely claiming to be a member of the armed forces and a police
officer.  Kenrick was apprehended in October 2004 and indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. §
2423(b).
3Pursuant to a plea agreement entered on July 7, 2005, Kenrick pled guilty to the
charged offense.  He was sentenced to 46 months imprisonment, followed by a life term
of supervised release.  Kenrick appealed the length and conditions of the supervised
release and this court vacated the supervised release condition, holding, inter alia, that the
District Court gave insufficient reasons for the imposition of the life term.
On remand, the District Court again sentenced Kenrick to a life term of supervised
release, and Kenrick again appeals.  This court exercises de novo review over the
enforcement and interpretation of plea agreements, and Kenrick must prove a breach of
the Plea Agreement by a preponderance of the evidence.  United States v. Williams, 510
F.3d 416, 424 (3d Cir. 2007).
III.
A brief overview of the relevant Plea Agreement provisions is necessary before
analyzing the issues raised in Kenrick’s appeal.  Paragraph C.1 of the Plea Agreement
states, “[t]he penalty that may be imposed upon Derrick Kenrick is: . . . (c) A term of
supervised release of up to life, 18 U.S.C. §3583(k).”  App. at 75-76.  Paragraph C.3 of
the Plea Agreement states, “[t]he parties stipulate that the November 1, 2004, Sentencing
Guidelines are applicable in this case.”  Lastly, paragraph C.4 states, “[t]he parties agree
that a sentence at the upper end of the guideline range is reasonable in this case.”  App. at
76.
The gravamen of Kenrick’s claim is that the Plea Agreement does not authorize a
4life term of supervised release because the term “sentence,” as it appears in paragraph C.4
of the Plea Agreement, refers only to imprisonment, not supervised release.  However, the
plain language of the plea agreement supports the District Court’s conclusion that the
parties agreed to a life term of supervised release.  Plea agreements are analyzed under
contract law standards, United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 236 (3d Cir. 1998),
and, therefore, this court must “examine the plain meaning of the agreement itself and
construe any ambiguities in the agreement against the government as drafter.”  Williams,
510 F.3d at 424-25.
There is no ambiguity regarding Kenrick’s “sentence,” nor does Kenrick proffer
any other reasonable interpretation of that term.  A “sentence” encompasses many forms
of punishment, including imprisonment and supervised release, and Kenrick cannot point
to any language in the Plea Agreement indicating otherwise.  Likewise, it strains common
understanding to restrict the term “sentence” to mean only the length of imprisonment.
See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1242 (defining “sentence” as “a
judicial decision of the punishment to be inflicted on one adjudged guilty”) (3d ed. 1993). 
Moreover, in paragraph C.1, Kenrick and the government agreed that the “penalty”
to be imposed on Kenrick includes (a) imprisonment; (b) a fine; (c) supervised release;
(d) a special assessment; and (e) mandatory restitution.  Because Kenrick’s “penalty,” by
agreement, encompasses supervised release, the term “sentence,” which is after all the
penalty, necessarily does as well.
5After a careful reading of the Plea Agreement, it is evident that the Plea
Agreement is unambiguous and the term “sentence” was intended to encompass more
than just the length of imprisonment.  Supervised release is a part of Kenrick’s “sentence”
and the guidelines not only authorize a court to impose a life sentence of supervised
release for sex offenses but expressly recommend it.  U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2 (Policy
Statement) (“If the instant offense of conviction is a sex offense, however, the statutory
maximum term of supervised release is recommended.”).
Finally, when this case was before us previously we remanded this issue, saying
While we are mindful that the 2004 Sentencing Guidelines
expressly provide for the possibility of a lifetime term of
supervised release for Kenrick’s offense, inasmuch as the
district court did not provide adequate reasons for its decision,
we also will vacate this provision of the sentence and remand
the case so that the court may reconsider this issue during
Kenrick’s resentencing as well.
United States v. Kenrick, 241 Fed. Appx. 10, 17-18 (3d Cir. 2007).  On resentencing, the
District Court stated, inter alia, that (1) the maximum life term of supervised release
“counterbalances the otherwise too lenient term of imprisonment” to which the parties
agreed; (2) the victim was only 13 years old when Kenrick contacted her; (3) he worked
to meet other young girls on internet chat rooms and deceived them to garner their
sympathy; (4) he threatened the victim’s mother; and (5) lifetime supervision is the
recommended term of supervised release for sex offenders such as Kenrick.  We note that
we are satisfied that the District Court provided adequate reasons for imposing a life term
of supervised release on remand.
IV.
For the above mentioned reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s sentence of a
life term of supervised release.
6
